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is likely to be slow and volatile.
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The Fed:  A Central Bank with a Regional Structure
P R e s I D e n t ’ s   M e s s A g e
U
rban vs. rural.  East Coast vs. the rest of 
the country.  Big bankers and big busi-
ness vs. everyone else.  More vs. less govern-
ment control.
Familiar as these controversies may seem, 
they aren’t references to the battles of today 
but to the forces that were at play a century 
ago in the years immediately preceding the 
founding of the Federal Reserve System. 
By the time the Banking Panic of 1907 
struck, the country had been without a cen-
tral bank for 70 years.  The first two central 
banks (the First and Second Banks of the 
United States, 1791-1811 and 1817-1837) 
were each shut down after two decades, in 
part because most of the country was hostile 
toward a centralization and concentration 
of banking power.  But after a succession 
of bank runs, credit shortages and finan-
cial crises, by the early 20th century most 
people recognized that an overhaul of the 
banking and monetary system was needed. 
Wall Street bankers wanted a more efficient 
system—a private central bank that they 
controlled.  Those outside the power centers 
of New York and Washington wanted a 
structure that would meet the needs of 
all regions of the country; many of these 
people felt that bankers—especially big city 
bankers—served primarily the wealthy.  
This group also wanted at least some public 
oversight in the system. 
The need for reform was basic:  The sup- 
plies of currency and bank loans were inflex-
ible, tied more to the nation’s gold reserves 
and supply of government debt than to the 
needs of business and agriculture.  This 
“inelastic currency” led to high interest rates 
and tight credit when demand for money was 
high and couldn’t be met—for example, at 
harvest time.  Although banks held reserves 
in about 50 cities, the largest volume was kept   
in New York.  Hence, sharp increases in the  
demand for money around the country cre-
ated major liquidity problems for banks in 
New York, at the nation’s financial center.  
Financial crises provoked suspension of  
payments and significant recessions.
In the wake of the 1907 Panic and result-
ing recession, Congress set up the National 
Monetary Commission to study central 
banks and banking in other countries and 
propose a structure for the United States.  
Three years later, the commission presented 
the Aldrich Plan, named for its chairman, 
Sen. Nelson Aldrich, R-R.I.  The most power- 
ful senator of his day, he was viewed as a 
stand-in for the banking and business elite 
of the East.  His plan called for one central  
institution with branches across the coun-
try.  Control would rest with a board domi-
nated by bankers.  Unlike the First Bank 
and Second Bank of the United States, the 
government would have no financial stake 
in this proposed structure.
Aldrich’s timing couldn’t have been worse.  
His party had just lost control of Congress, 
thanks to the growing popularity of the Pro-
gressive movement.  Like the populists of the 
previous century, the progressives were wary 
of the concentration of economic and politi-
cal power.  They fought the monopolization 
of key industries, which usually was assisted 
by powerful bankers.  Although progressives 
supported banking reform, they advocated 
some controls by the government to protect 
society at large, and they insisted on a struc-
ture that allowed the varying credit needs of 
the different parts of the country to be met. 
The election of Democrat Woodrow Wil-
son to the presidency in 1912 killed Aldrich’s 
plan.  Wilson opposed the creation of a 
central bank and had railed in his campaign 
against “the money monopoly.”  Wilson’s 
advisers presented an alternative plan:  about 
20 private, locally controlled regional reserve 
banks.  They would not only hold the reserves 
of their member banks so that the money was 
close at hand when needed locally, but would 
meet member banks’ other currency and 
credit needs.  Eventually, the plan also called 
for the reserve banks to supervise those 
member banks, issue currency against com-
mercial assets and gold, and perform other 
central banking functions.  Wilson approved 
of the plan but, reflecting the progressives’ 
desire for some government oversight, pro-
posed a central board of government appoin-
tees in Washington to control and coordinate 
the work of the regional banks.  (At its incep-
tion, this board was relatively weak—and cer-
tainly not as powerful as it exists today.)  In a 
nod to bankers, Wilson proposed the Federal 
Advisory Council; each regional bank would 
elect one banker to serve on this council and 
meet occasionally with the central board. 
Though wrangling continued over the 
number of regional reserve banks (the final 
number was 12) and their locations, Wilson’s 
plan was, for the most part, what was passed 
by Congress in 1913.  Although the structure 
took many turns in subsequent years, the 
Federal Reserve System was born—and still 
stands—as a central bank with a decentral-
ized structure, one with regional representa-
tion, but public oversight—a classic example 
of checks and balances in U.S. democracy.  
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Economic Hangover
Recovery Is Likely To Be Prolonged, Painful
By Bill EmmonsT
he global financial crisis and the Great Recession 
of 2008-09 marked the end of a decade that 
seemed too good to be true for many Americans.  
After escaping the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 relatively unscathed, the 
U.S. economy experienced historic booms in stock markets, housing markets 
and credit markets.  Huge increases in households’ wealth and borrowing, in 
turn, supported robust consumer-spending growth and housing investment  
despite moderate growth of income for most.  To be sure, many Americans were 
excluded from the good times, but many broad-based measures of economic 
welfare—such as the unemployment rate, consumer-spending growth, access  
to credit and the homeownership rate—rivaled or attained their best levels ever.
This “dream world” of rising wealth and material well-being became a night-
mare in 2008.  The value of stocks, nonfederal bonds and houses plunged; credit 
became unavailable to many, while mortgage foreclosures soared; and the global 
economy sank into a deep recession.  Meanwhile, most of an enormous increase 
in household debt accumulated during the free-spending decade remained in 
place, and government borrowing exploded.
Were the recent financial crisis and the ensuing severe recession merely  
“bad luck” that we might have avoided if we had, for example, cracked down  
on subprime mortgage lending much earlier?  Or was the bursting of stock-
market, housing and credit bubbles inevitable, sooner or later?  The answers to 
these questions are important for gauging the future of the U.S. economy.  If we 
simply were sidetracked by the financial crisis and recession, then we can expect 
eventually to resume many of the trends and features of the pre-2007 economy.  
If, on the other hand, the 1998-2007 decade itself was an anomaly, the crisis 
may, in fact, signal a necessary transition—albeit a painful one—to a less free-
spending but more sustainable trajectory for the U.S. economy.
This article is divided into two main parts.  The first takes a look back at the 
decade preceding the financial crisis to understand why the downturn was so 
severe.  In retrospect, it appears that some sort of  “course correction” was inevi-
table.  The U.S. economy had become dangerously dependent on consumer bor-
rowing and spending, which, in turn, depended to a large degree on rapidly rising 
house prices.  At the same time, many other countries had developed their own 
dependence on exporting to the United States.  To keep export growth high, 
these nations increasingly relied on a type of vendor financing—that is, they lent 
us the money to buy their exports.  The financial crisis marked the end of this 
uneasy equilibrium.  When house prices stopped rising, millions of American 
households no longer could support the debt they had taken on that allowed 
them to spend more than their incomes on housing, services and durable goods—
a large portion of which came from overseas.  The second part of the article 
looks forward.  While it’s always difficult to forecast the future, three possible 
scenarios for the economy are examined.  Nothing about the future economy is 
certain, but we are likely to face a prolonged and painful period of adjustment.
Part I: The Past
A Decade of Credit-Fueled Growth  
in Household Spending 
U.S. household spending grew consider-
ably faster during the 1997-2007 decade 
than personal income.  Figure 1 shows that 
per-person expenditures on goods and 
services grew about 29 percent in inflation-
adjusted terms between 1997 and 2007, 
while per-person after-tax income grew 
only about 25 percent.  Per-person inflation-
adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew only about 22 percent.
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The result of spending growth exceed-
ing income growth is a falling saving rate, 
whether for an individual family or for the 
nation as a whole.  Figure 2 shows that the 
U.S. household saving rate fell from about  
5 percent during 1997-98 (already a histori-
cally low level) to about 2 percent during 
Part II: The Future
The Uncertain Outlook
Given the large role of household spend-
ing on goods, services and housing in the 
American and, indeed, the global economy 
during recent years, newly frugal consum-
ers are likely to keep economic growth rates 
subdued for some time.  In view of Ameri-
can households’ historically high debt bur-
den and the potential for negative feedback 
effects on income growth itself, a protracted, 
years-long period of painful adjustment 
appears likely.
Is there any escape from this scenario 
of growth-inhibiting household deleverag-
ing?  Perhaps, but it will require significant 
changes in consumer behavior and national 
economic policies.  In broad outline, Amer-
ican consumers must durably raise their 
saving rates and the federal government 
must come much closer to balancing its 
budget on a consistent basis even in the face 
of looming deficits of unprecedented size.  
Other countries must stimulate domestic 
spending and reduce their large trade sur-
pluses, which result in large capital exports 
to the United States and other countries.
continued on Page 6
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illustration by nigel buchanan The Regional Economist  |  www.stlouisfed.org   56   The Regional Economist  |  April 2010
2005-07.  The figure also shows that the U.S. 
household borrowing rate—defined as the 
annual increase in the amount of household 
debt outstanding as a percent of disposable 
income—was very high during the decade.
The period 1997-2007, thus, was a decade 
of rising household debt.  Figure 3 shows the 
increase in household indebtedness after 
1997 relative to the increase in household 
income.  Inflation-adjusted per-person   
debt increased more than 80 percent 
between 1997 and 2007, the largest increase 
over a 10-year span since the 1960s.  The 
lion’s share of household borrowing during 
the decade was secured against owner-
occupied housing—that is, in the form of 
mortgage debt.  The amount of inflation-
adjusted mortgage debt outstanding per 
person nearly doubled between 1997 
and 2007, while the value of household 
real estate grew a bit less than 90 percent 
through 2007.
Aggressive mortgage borrowing might 
have seemed like a good idea as long as 
housing and other asset values were rising.  
Now that housing values have declined 
sharply in many parts of the country, the 
inherent risk of leverage has been exposed.  
Debt magnifies both the gains and losses  
on the asset being financed.  The 65 percent 
of U.S. home-owning households that  
have any mortgage debt together appear  
to have lost virtually all of their homeown-
ers’ equity between early 2006 and early 
2009, almost $6 trillion (Figure 4).  Com-
pounded by rising unemployment, the loss 
of homeowners’ equity has been a major 
factor driving mortgage-foreclosure rates  
to historic highs.
2
A Growing but Unbalanced 
U.S. Economy
Although overall U.S. economic growth 
during the decade through 2007 averaged 
about 3 percent annually, just as it had dur-
ing the previous 10 years, the composition 
and financing of U.S. growth were quite dif-
ferent across the two decades.  The economy 
after 1997 became dominated by consumer 
and government spending at the expense 
of business investment and exports, while 
continued from Page 5
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the domestic investment that took place 
was skewed toward residential building and 
increasingly relied on funds provided by 
foreign investors in the U.S.
The Composition of U.S. GDP Growth
While consumer spending accounted 
for about 65 percent of economic growth 
during the 1988-1997 decade, it consti-
tuted 82.5 percent of growth during the 
1998-2007 decade (Table 1).  Government 
spending on goods and services contributed 
a further 14 percent to economic growth 
during the later decade, compared with 
only 7 percent during the earlier decade.  
Thus, consumer and government spending 
together accounted for 72 percent of GDP 
growth during the 1988-97 decade, but  
96 percent during the 1998-2007 decade.
Compared with the longer U.S. post-
World War II history, the composition of 
GDP growth during 1998-2007 also was 
unusual.  Consumer and government 
spending together constituted about 81 
percent of GDP growth during the 1950-87 
period, while business investment and  
net exports together accounted for about  
11 percent.  The corresponding figures of  
96 and 3 percent, respectively, for the 1998-
2007 period betray a significant shift  
toward consumer and government spend-
ing at the expense of business investment 
and net exports.
The Financing of U.S. Investment
Another way to look at the economy is 
to see how its investment is financed.  Any 
nation has two sources of funds for invest-
ment—domestic saving and borrowing 
from abroad.  Because the household sector 
is such a large part of the U.S. economy, it 
should come as no surprise that the declining 
household saving rate during the 1997-2007  
decade was echoed by a shift toward foreign 
borrowing by the nation as a whole.  As 
shown in Table 1, the U.S. trade deficit 
increased sharply after 1997.  This implies, as 
a matter of accounting, that the U.S. greatly 
increased its borrowing from foreigners.   
U.S. net borrowing from abroad exceeded  
4 percent of GDP each year from 2000 
through 2008 (with the exception of 2001, at 
3.9 percent), a level not previously exceeded 
since the early part of the 20th century. 
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Is Unbalanced Growth Better  
than No Growth at All?
While the trends just described were 
visible at the time, many commentators 
dismissed them as harmless or, indeed, 
beneficial aspects of an increasingly global-
ized world economy.  Their argument was 
seductively simple:  Just as individuals and 
nations specialize in activities they do best 
and trade with others to increase the welfare 
of all, perhaps the globalization of goods, 
services and capital markets would allow the 
United States to concentrate on what it did 
best and then trade with others that special-
ized differently.
The obvious flaw in this argument is that 
what the U.S. appeared to do best on a large 
scale—consumer spending, homebuilding, 
borrowing and the provision of sophisti-
cated financial services, such as mortgage 
securitization—did not result in a stable,  
let alone balanced, international trade posi-
tion or a stable saving rate.  In fact, the U.S.  
trade deficit—more precisely, the current-
account deficit—doubled as a percent of 
GDP between 1997 and 1999, then nearly 
doubled again by 2006.  Had this trend 
continued, financing our burgeoning trade 
deficit would have become increasingly  
difficult.  At the same time, the household  
(and national) saving rate was falling per-
sistently—which it could not do forever.  It 
now appears that, by 1997 or 1998 at the 
latest, the U.S. economy had embarked on a 
path of unbalanced growth.  Sooner or later, 
a major course correction was inevitable.
As it turned out, some of the rebalancing 
had begun before the financial crisis and 
recession hit.  In particular, house prices 
stopped rising in about 2006.  Increasing  
numbers of households defaulted on their  
unsupportable debts, a fate merely postponed 
by rising house prices during the preceding 
years.  As mortgage defaults and market-
value losses on mortgage-backed securities 
rippled through the financial system, the 
economy itself began to slow sharply.  The 
severe financial and economic shocks of 
2008 and 2009 were the ultimate result and 
have accelerated the reversal of the trends in 
place for a decade.
Global Imbalances—Part of the  
Solution or the Problem?
Just as the U.S. economy evolved in an 
unbalanced and historically unusual way 
after the Asian crisis of 1997-98, unusual 
international developments were taking 
place.  Average rates of U.S. and world 
economic growth were healthy during the 
1997-2007 decade, but individual econo-
mies diverged markedly in how they grew.  
Consumer spending, housing investment 
and government spending took on increas-
ing importance in the United States and in 
some other high-income countries like the 
United Kingdom, while business investment 
and exports lagged.  At the same time, many 
other countries—including both high-
income and developing countries—were 
virtual mirror images of the U.S., increas-
ing business investment and exports faster 
than consumer or government spending.  
The U.S. personal and national saving rates 
declined to historic lows, while these “mir-
ror-image” countries experienced sharply 
higher saving rates.
To secure a more even pattern of invest-
ment around the world, the countries with a 
surplus of savings together lent hundreds of 
billions of dollars each year to the countries 
generating insufficient domestic savings to 
fund desired investment.  By accounting  
necessity, these growing international 
coMp o s i t i o n   o f  u.s.  gDp gr o w t h
average annual 
real gDp growth 
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ment (i; % of 
gDp growth)
contribution of 
net exports (nX; 
% of gDp growth
sum of con-
tributions of  
i and nX (% of 
gDp growth)
1950-1987 3.72 63.4 18.8 81.2 13.0 –2.1 10.9
1988-1997 3.05 64.9 7.4 72.3 20.1 3.3 23.4
1998-2007 3.02 82.5 13.9 96.4 18.1 –15.5 2.6
source:  bureau of economic analysis
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capital flows were associated with offset- 
ting imbalances in the trade accounts of  
the respective countries.
Countries in the first group incurred 
increasing deficits on their international 
current accounts, while countries in the 
second group accumulated large surpluses.  
The deficit countries—including the U.S., 
the U.K., Spain and a few others—had in 
common relatively sophisticated finan-
cial systems and relaxed attitudes toward 
borrowing.  Surplus countries—including 
China, a number of other emerging-market 
countries, Japan, Germany and several 
oil-exporting countries—typically had 
less well-developed financial sectors and 
a less borrower-friendly climate.  Some 
surplus countries also appeared to follow 
an “export-led growth strategy,” defined 
by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to include an undervalued exchange 
rate together with measures to compress 
domestic spending.
3  The result of these 
policies was to increase the country’s trade 
surplus and, at the same time, increase its 
financial-account deficit (lending abroad).  
The emergence of large global imbalances 
during the decade after the Asian crisis has 
been studied in great detail, while their 
interpretation remains open to debate.
4
The IMF and other analysts have out-
lined a number of scenarios for the world 
economy during the next few years.
5  The 
possibilities range from very good—an 
internationally coordinated restructuring 
of key economies—to very bad—a retreat 
into short-sighted, protectionist policies 
leading to a renewed global economic 
slump.  Which outcome ultimately occurs 
depends on how private and public actors 
behave during the next few, critical months 
and years.  Here are three broad scenarios, 
together with the policy actions that would 
make them possible.
Scenario 1:  Global Cooperation To  
Rebalance World Output and Demand
The most optimistic scenario entails 
wide-spread, simultaneous efforts by the 
leaders and ordinary citizens of many 
countries to refocus their economies on 
sustainable domestic production and con-
sumption.  In this context, sustainability 
refers to patterns of work, investment and 
spending that do not rely on persistent, large 
international transfers of economic and 
financial resources.  Drawing an analogy to 
an individual household, the basic idea is 
that “profligate” consumers should plan to 
spend within their means without frequent 
recourse to borrowing, while “miserly” 
households should avoid accumulating 
excessive savings that are lent to others.  At 
the national level, it implies that interna-
tional trade and financial balances should 
not be far from zero in either direction over 
long periods of time.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has incurred very 
large trade deficits and corresponding finan-
cial surpluses (capital imports) for decades.  
Moreover, the imbalances grew sharply 
during the 1997-2007 decade.  This pattern 
of increasingly unsustainable economic 
growth was an important contributor to the 
global economic and financial crisis that 
occurred because, ultimately, millions of 
American households buckled under exces-
sive burdens of unsupported debt when 
house prices declined.
At the same time that many American 
households were digging themselves deeper 
into debt, there were offsetting imbalances 
building up in other countries.  Given the 
interdependent nature of international trade 
and capital flows, it clearly would be best if 
coordinated behavior and policy changes 
could be undertaken in many or all of the 
affected countries. 
A benign global rebalancing would see 
deficit countries, such as the United States, 
increase saving by households and the fed-
eral government, while increasing business 
investment and exports.  At the same time, 
surplus countries such as China would expand 
social safety nets (to decrease households’ 
need to save), improve corporate governance 
(to decrease hoarding of cash and wasteful 
overinvestment), and encourage consumer 
spending and imports.  Other groups of sur-
plus countries also could contribute mean-
ingfully to global rebalancing.  For example, 
oil-exporting countries could delink oil 
prices from the dollar, and the aging econo-
mies of Europe and Japan could take actions 
to raise their domestic growth potential.
6
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the possibilities range from 
very good—an internationally 
coordinated restructuring 
of key economies—to very 
bad—a retreat into short-
sighted, protectionist policies 
leading to a renewed global 
economic slump.The Regional Economist  |  www.stlouisfed.org   9
deficits and near-zero short-term interest  
rates—which probably kept the global 
economy out of a depression—are reversed 
abruptly and if private-sector spending 
slows unexpectedly, economies around the 
world could fall back into a slump as bad as 
or worse than the downturn experienced 
during 2008 and 2009.  Under these circum-
stances of a “double-dip” global recession, 
renewed policy interventions might need to 
be even more drastic than during the first 
downturn.  Further long-lasting economic 
damage in the form of long-term unemploy-
ment and financial defaults would occur.
Conclusion
Paying the Piper
With the benefit of hindsight, one can 
say we should have seen the financial crisis 
coming.  Although some analysts pointed 
to unbalanced U.S. economic growth and 
growing global financial imbalances, few 
anticipated how rapid, severe and global the 
downturn would turn out to be.
Americans almost certainly will save 
more, spend in closer proportion to their 
income and increase their borrowing more 
slowly, or decrease it outright in the coming  
years.  Said differently, a protracted period 
of household “deleveraging” appears likely.  
This will translate into relatively slow 
consumer spending and overall economic 
growth unless other sources of demand 
materialize.  If economic growth remains 
weak, it will mean that house prices remain 
subdued, mortgage defaults remain high 
due to frequent instances of negative home-
owners’ equity and the average American 
household’s financial situation improves 
only slowly.
One bitter lesson we have learned is that 
unbalanced growth, whether in one country 
or around the world, brings risks in its wake.   
Unless we are able to rebalance our own 
economy and, in cooperation with other 
major countries, do the same at the global 
level, we are likely to face a long period of 
slow and volatile economic recovery.  
Bill Emmons is an economist at the Federal  
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  For more on his 
work, see http://www.stlouisfed.org/banking/
pdf/SPA/Emmons_vitae.pdf
This benign-rebalancing scenario probably 
would be associated with weaker currency 
values in deficit countries and stronger 
currencies in surplus countries.  Orderly 
exchange-rate changes can moderate the 
domestic adjustments needed in wages and 
prices to support changing trade patterns.
Scenario 2:  Lack of Coordinated Policy 
Adjustments—Global Imbalances Return
Less-benign outcomes are possible, of 
course.  Continued reliance on export-led  
growth strategies in major emerging mar-
kets and some large, advanced countries 
could frustrate attempts by the U.S. to shift 
its economy away from excessive consumer 
and government borrowing and spending  
and toward business investment and exports.   
Conversely, our trading partners could take 
positive steps that our own indifference or 
policy gridlock negated.
Suppose the U.S. unilaterally made a 
number of politically difficult policy choices 
that would support economic restructur-
ing and global rebalancing.  These might 
include reducing tax incentives that favor 
excessive housing investment, mortgage 
borrowing and health-care expenditures, 
as well as implementing a broad-based 
consumption tax designed to encourage 
saving over consumer spending.  But if our 
trading partners did not simultaneously 
increase their willingness and ability to buy 
our exports, the result could be disastrous.  
A very weak U.S. economy could be crippled 
by an even more depressed housing market 
and a shrinking health-care sector, while 
export sectors showed negligible improve-
ment over their growth baselines.  The 
political response likely would be to reverse 
the reforms and expand bailout efforts.  A 
return to low household and national sav-
ing, unbalanced domestic growth and global 
imbalances probably would follow.
Scenario 3:  No Policy Adjustments and 
Premature Withdrawal of Macroeconomic 
Support—Global Slump Returns
A third possibility is that no progress 
toward economic restructuring of any kind 
is made, while policymakers in the United 
States and elsewhere misjudge the strength 
of economic recovery.  If government 
policies that have resulted in large budget 
E N DNO T E S
1   Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.  An 
important reason why household after-tax  
income grew faster than GDP was that tax 
rates were reduced in the early 2000s.  Thus, 
part of the growth in disposable household 
income during the decade represented a  
redistribution of national income, rather  
than genuine increases in output.
2   See Emmons.  The aggregate value of home-
owners’ equity conceals a wide variety of 
individual situations.  Many homeowners 
with mortgage debt have positive equity, while 
many others have negative equity.  It is those 
with negative equity who are at greatest risk  
of default.
3   See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti.
4   See Bernanke and Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti.
5   See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti.
6   Delinking oil prices from the dollar might 
divert some capital exports from oil export-
ing-nations into non-U.S. markets, resulting 
in less upward pressure on the dollar.  Mean-
while, deregulating labor markets and service 
sectors in the aging nations of Europe and 
Japan could raise domestic growth potential 
and reduce trade surpluses.
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No. 4, pp. 14-15.long with the spread of the financial  
crisis that began in 2007, the world  
experienced the largest recession since the 
Great Depression.  According to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, world GDP fell by  
0.8 percent in 2009, while advanced econo-
mies experienced a contraction of 3.2 per- 
cent, the largest decline in the past 50 years.  
Exports from the advanced economies fell 
even more, by a staggering 12.3 percent, about 
four times as much as the drop in GDP and 
approximately as much as exports to the 
advanced economies.
The figure shows the rate of growth of U.S. 
GDP, imports and exports, as well as a pattern 
that was common to many other countries 
during the crisis:  The imports and exports of 
advanced, emerging and developing econo-
mies fell by similar percentages, ranging from 
a minimum of 11.7 percent to a maximum of 
13.5 percent.  Similarly, the rebound of U.S. 
trade flows that appears in the figure at the 
end of 2009 was observed in other countries.
The larger-than-expected drop in trade 
has puzzled economists and commentators 
throughout the current recession.  A number 
of trade scholars are looking into potential 
culprits.
The suspect that can be easily discarded is 
trade restrictions.  Unlike during other reces-
sions and the Great Depression, countries 
have not used trade measures—such as tariffs, 
quotas or anti-dumping measures—during 
this recession to restrict imports.  One reason 
is the World Trade Organization forbids these 
measures; another reason is we now under-
stand that trade restrictions worsened the 
Great Depression.
The remaining causes for the plummet in 
exports are more difficult to discard:  the col-
lapse of trade finance, the increase in vertical 
specialization and the composition of trade 
flows.  Traditional textbook analysis of trade 
dynamics during recessions attributes  
trade decline to lower demand for final good  
imports in the country experiencing a con-
traction.  However, the changes in the way 
trade is financed and organized, along with 
a better understanding of the international 
economy, induced economists to focus on the 
three elements we discuss here.
First Suspect: Finance
Various studies have documented the 
importance of finance for international trade 
transactions, as financial institutions are key 
suppliers of services such as the evaluation of 
counterparty default risk and the provision  
of payment insurance and guarantees to  
exporters.  Economist Marc Auboin esti-
mated that about 90 percent of international 
trade transactions rely on one form or 
another of trade finance. 
Therefore, the conjecture is that the credit 
crunch may have caused the large decline 
in world trade by reducing firms’ access to 
finance.  A study by economists Mary Amiti 
and David Weinstein has shown that a similar 
mechanism was at work during the Japanese 
crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  They 
found that lack of financing accounted for 
nearly one-third of the plunge in Japanese 
exports during the 1990s. 
Fresh evidence for the current recession is 
hard to come by and to date exists only for 
exports to the U.S.  Economists Davin Chor 
and Kalina Manova found that countries with 
tighter credit availability during the crisis 
exported less to the U.S.  Moreover, exports to 
the U.S. contracted more in sectors that other 
research has shown to be more heavily depen-
dent on extensive external financing.  This 
early evidence suggests that the trade finance 
nexus seems to be one of the explanations 
of the trade contraction during the current 
crisis, at least for the U.S. 
Second Suspect: Vertical Fragmentation
The second suspect is vertical fragmenta-
tion, a form of international trade that has 
been growing exponentially with the spread 
of globalization in the past 20 years.  We 
normally think of international trade as being 
dominated by final goods, those that do not 
need further processing.  On the contrary, 
the data show that international trade in 
industrialized countries is dominated by 
capital goods (such as machinery) and other 
types of intermediate goods (such as steel) 
that are normally used for the production of 
consumer goods.  In the case of the U.S., these 
intermediate goods account for nearly three-
fourths of total imports and exports.  
As massive freighters have minimized the 
cost of transport, international sharing of pro-
duction has increased.  Goods are increasingly 
manufactured in stages in different countries.  
Before a product is completed and shipped to 
its final destination, its components have often 
crossed borders several times.
Consider the example of the iPhone.  Its 
CPU and video processing are made in Sin-
gapore.  Its digital camera, circuit boards and 
metal casings are made in Taiwan.  Its touch-
screen controllers are made in the U.S.  From 
these countries, all components are then 
shipped and assembled in Shenzhen, China, 
before being delivered to final consumers in 
various countries.  Complete iPhones arrive 
to American consumers after the phones’ 
components have crossed at least four bor-
ders, including the U.S. border twice. 
If the demand for final goods declines, the 
first effect is that the demand for intermedi-
ate goods suffers in each of the countries 
in which production takes place.  At the 
g L o B A L   e c o n o M Y
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to suffer more than GDP because at each 
border crossing the full value of the partly 
assembled good is recorded as trade, while 
GDP measures only value added.  In order to 
understand the difference, consider a simple 
good like a pencil, made of two components, 
wood and graphite, assembled using labor.  
When the pencil is produced entirely in the 
U.S., its contribution to U.S. GDP is the final 
price to consumers (say $1) net of the cost 
of its components (80 cents); therefore, 20 
cents of value has been added.  When the 
pencil is only assembled in the U.S. but its 
components are imported from Canada, 
for example, and demand for pencils in the 
U.S. falls by one unit, U.S. GDP falls by 20 
cents, but U.S. imports from Canada fall by 
80 cents, four times as much!  This happens 
because GDP is a value-added measure while 
trade is a gross measure.
Economist Caroline Freund estimates that 
when world income increases by 1 percent 
these days, trade increases, on average, by 3.5 
percent.  In the 1960s, the impact of an equiva-
lent change in income on trade was only 2 
percent.  This is likely related to the increase  
in vertical specialization.  Various other 
economists have provided evidence that the 
recent decline in trade is stronger in sectors 
that make intense use of intermediate inputs. 
Third Suspect: Compositional Effect
During recessions, consumers and firms 
demand fewer goods; however, the decline in 
demand is less than equal across all indus-
tries because some sectors are more impacted 
than others.  When households and firms 
adjust their spending downward, the demand 
for both domestic and imported goods falls.  
Now, if international trade is concentrated 
in the sectors that are most impacted by the 
negative economic shock, then overall trade 
should experience a greater fall than GDP.  
For example, consider the case in which over-
all U.S. GDP declines by 2 percent, but the 
agricultural component of GDP falls by, say,  
7 percent.  If trade is particularly concentrated 
in agriculture, then we would observe a drop 
in trade larger than the drop in overall GDP.
The composition of the decline in demand 
may affect the magnitude of the decline in 
trade simply because there may be more trade   
in the sectors that were hit the hardest.  Econ- 
omists Andrei Levchenko, Logan Lewis and 
Linda Tesar show that this is exactly what 
happened to the U.S. during the current 
recession; the largest declines in trade are 
recorded for those sectors that had the larg-
est drops in output (industrial supplies and 
materials, computers, peripherals and parts, 
automotive vehicles, engines and parts).  This 
may also explain why international trade in 
services other than finance, transport and 
tourism fell by much less than overall trade, 
as the service component of GDP fell much 
less than overall GDP during the crisis. 
A One-Time Thing?
The international economy operates as a 
network in which the line between producer 
and consumer continues to zig-zag and blur.  
In such a world, it is key to recognize those 
factors that have the most influence on inter-
national trade.  Economists have identified 
three main suspects as the leading causes of 
declining trade volumes during the current 
recession and, by lining up the suspects, they 
have been able to analyze the causes’ indivi-
dual contributions to the trade collapse, at 
least for the U.S.  As new data from the cur-
rent crisis become available, other countries 
will be studied in order to help us understand 
whether the large drop in trade is specific  
to this recession or will likely reappear in  
future recessions.  In the meantime, most  
projections for this year indicate a recovery  
in world GDP (3.9 percent in the World  
Economic Outlook of the International  
Monetary Fund) and in world trade (a robust 
5.8 percent increase).  
Silvio Contessi is an economist and Hoda  
El-Ghazaly is a research associate at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  For more on 
Contessi’s work, see http://research.stlouisfed.
org/econ/contessi
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source: authors’ calculations based on data from the u.s. census bureau and the bureau of economic analysis.
Growth RatesC
ompared with income inequality in 
the United States, differences in living 
standards worldwide are staggering.  In 
2000, real gross state product (GSP) per 
worker for Connecticut was approximately 
$92,000; this is almost 90 percent larger 
than in Mississippi, where the total was 
nearly $49,000.
1  In contrast, while real 
gross domestic product (GDP) per worker 
totaled almost $1,000 in Burundi in 2000,  
it exceeded $100,000 in Luxembourg.
2  How 
such large differences in GDP per worker 
can persist in an increasingly global world  
is one of the key questions in economics.
Some factors behind the persistent dispar-
ity in income per worker are obvious.  There 
are large differences across countries in the 
amount (and quality) of factories and equip-
ment available for production (that is, physical 
capital) and in workers’ stock of knowledge 
and ability (that is, human capital).  Physical 
and human capital, however, do not com-
pletely determine output per worker.  In fact, 
large portions of the differences in income per 
worker between nations cannot be explained 
by the accumulation of either kind of capital 
alone.  For instance, output per worker in 
Mexico is seven times that of China even 
though concentrations of physical and human 
capital are quite similar.
3  Income differences 
that cannot be explained by differences in 
physical and human capital are attributed to 
total factor productivity (TFP).  
Explaining Productivity
Productivity plays an important role in 
determining output.  First, increases in  
productivity stimulate output for fixed  
levels of inputs by allowing for more effi-
cient use of resources.  Moreover, there is 
a strong relationship between productivity 
and human and physical capital.  Higher 
By Riccardo DiCecio
p R o D u C T I V I T y
Income Differences around Globe
                 Go Beyond physical, Human Capital
productivity leads to more investment, 
further increasing output.  Because of the 
key role of productivity in determining 
output, understanding why productivity 
differs across countries is important for 
understanding global income-per-worker 
disparities.
The most productive nations share char-
acteristics such as strong property rights, 
government transparency, limited corrup-
tion and limited barriers to entry.  These 
forms of social infrastructure ensure that 
private investment and innovation are  
properly rewarded and that productive 
inputs are effectively used.
The effect of barriers to entry on pro-
ductivity has received much attention in 
the economics literature.  Ease of entry for 
new business fosters competition and, thus, 
encourages productivity.  Where it is easier 
for new businesses to develop, established 
firms must constantly consider the threat  
of new competition, which increases pro-
ductivity.  Furthermore, it is crucial that 
capital and labor are allocated to their most 
productive use.  For example, a 2009 study 
finds that reallocating productive factors 
(capital and labor) across firms such that 
their marginal products
4 equal those in the 
United States would lead to TFP gains of 
40-60 percent in India and 30-50 percent in 
China in the manufacturing sector.
5
Recent research has focused on the 
causes of misallocation of productive fac-
tors across firms/sectors and on the causes 
of distortions in industry structure.  Two 
causes—financial constraints and the costs 
associated with regulation compliance—are 
discussed in the following sections.  While 
earlier studies used statistical techniques to 
analyze the determinants of TFP, the more 
recent studies summarized below rely on 
detailed economic models of firms’ entry, 
operation and exit decisions.
Starting a New Business:  
Financial Constraints
A poorly developed financial sector may 
hinder the creation of new businesses in 
some nations.  In the developed world, 
credit is a part of everyday life.  New busi-
ness owners gain use of equipment and floor 
space that they cannot afford with cash 
because banks reasonably assume that peo-
ple are willing and able to pay off debt.  Else-
where, however, microfinance loans totaling 
mere hundreds of dollars are viewed as rare 
and exciting business opportunities.
A 2009 study presents a model where 
borrowing constraints distort the number 
of firms, the allocation of entrepreneurial 
talent and the allocation of capital across 
firms.
6  The ability to pay for fixed operat-
ing costs depends on an individual’s wealth 
and not on her entrepreneurial ability:  
Talented-but-poor individuals are inef-
ficiently excluded from starting a business.  
Consistent with the data, the model predicts 
that high fixed costs result in sectors with 
fewer entrepreneurs (and establishments) 
than desired.  Moreover, the establishments 
tend to be larger than the optimal establish-
ment size.  As a result, the least financially 
developed countries have TFP that is more 
than 40 percent lower than in the United 
States.  Differences in financial development 
can explain 80 percent of the differences in 
income per capita between Mexico and the 
United States.
Starting a New Business:  
Regulations and Entry Costs
Some barriers to entry are the direct 
result of government policy.  From nation 
© saM Dcruz/shutterstock © ak photo/shutterstock
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  1  These figures are calculated by dividing the 
2000 real GSP (Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
by the labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
  2  See Heston, Summers and Aten.  The figures 
reported are real GDP per worker (in interna-
tional dollars, 1996 constant prices).
  3  See Hall and Jones.
  4  The marginal product of a productive factor 
is the extra quantity of output obtained by  
using one extra unit of that factor while keep-
ing the other productive factors constant.
  5  See Hsieh and Klenow.
  6  See Buera, Kaboski and Shin.
  7  See Barseghyan.
  8  See Barseghyan and DiCecio.
  9  See La Porta and Shleifer.
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to nation, there are great differences in the 
obstacles entrepreneurs must endure before 
starting a new business.  The World Bank’s 
Doing Business survey finds it hardest to 
establish a new business in Guinea-Bissau, 
where entrepreneurs face 16 procedures, 
213 days of waiting and fees totaling 323 
percent of income per capita.  In contrast, 
New Zealand’s entrepreneurs can open shop 
after completing one procedure, waiting 
one day and paying fees totaling less than 
1 percent of income per capita.  Policy in 
the United States is also fairly encouraging.  
New businesses can begin after an average 
of six procedures, a six-day wait and pay-
ing fees less than 1 percent of income per 
capita.  Although some barriers to entry will 
be present everywhere, regulatory barriers 
specifically differ between nations and play 
Although high entry costs discourage the creation of legitimate 
businesses, they encourage the creation of illegitimate ones—
that is, businesses concealed from public authorities to avoid 
paying taxes and complying with regulations.
an important role in determining nations’ 
productivity and output.
One convenient measure of entry barriers 
is the legal fees associated with starting a 
new business.  The influence of these entry 
costs, measured as a percent of GDP per 
capita, has been proven to be substantial in 
the literature.  A recent study finds that an 
80 percent (of per capita GDP) increase in 
these entry costs causes a 22 percent reduc-
tion in TFP and a 29 percent reduction in 
GDP per worker.
7
Current research finds further support 
for the importance of entry barriers, by 
focusing on a broader measure of entry 
costs which includes nonregulatory costs—
for example, sunk investment, technology 
acquisition and advertising.
8  A higher entry 
cost implies that fewer entrants are will-
ing to pay it, scaring away entrepreneurs 
who could potentially be highly productive.  
What’s left is a pool of producers sullied by 
low-productivity firms.  As a result, firms’ 
average productivity and TFP are low. 
The total effect of entry barriers on pro-
ductivity is profound.  For example, TFP 
declines by 0.14 percent for each 1 percent 
increase in entry costs.  This relationship— 
along with the large variation in entry 
costs—leads to large differences in economic 
outcomes across countries.  In the model 
created by this author and fellow economist 
Levon Barseghyan, TFP is 35 percent higher 
and output per worker is 57 percent higher, 
on average, in countries with low entry costs 
than in countries with high entry costs.  
Although high entry costs discourage 
the creation of legitimate businesses, they 
encourage the creation of illegitimate 
ones—that is, businesses concealed from 
public authorities to avoid paying taxes and 
complying with regulations.  The creation 
of a separate “shadow economy” provides 
some relief to entrepreneurs, but it hurts 
the nation as a whole.  Firms in the infor-
mal sector are smaller and less productive 
than small legally operating firms.
9  By 
discouraging new legitimate businesses 
and encouraging a larger shadow economy, 
high regulatory barriers to entry lead to an 
economy populated by a few inefficiently 
large legal firms and many inefficiently 
small firms in the informal economy.  
Riccardo DiCecio is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/dicecio/index.html for more 
on his work.
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olumbus, Miss., anchor of northeast-
ern Mississippi’s “golden triangle” 
area, has always turned heads, if only for 
its dozens of well-kept antebellum and 
Victorian homes.  Now, the city’s once 
rundown downtown also catches eyes, 
what with its colorfully refurbished 
facades on new shops, restaurants and 
upper-level apartments.  Small wonder, 
then, that Columbus earned a Preserve 
America award from the federal gov-
ernment in 2005 and a place on the 
National Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion’s annual Dozen Distinctive Desti-
nations list in 2008.
Meantime, surrounding Lowndes 
County as a whole has been grabbing 
attention for a different kind of renais-
sance—industrial and grand-scale.  The 
By Susan C. Thomson
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The Russian-owned Severstal plant 
was one of the first tenants on the tva-
anointed megasite next to the airport.  
by the end of this year, the plant will 
have the capacity to make 3.4 million 
tons of rolled steel a year.  the insert 
shows the exterior of the plant;  when 
it was being built, it was the largest 
industrial project in the nation.
large photo by susan c. thoMson 
inset photo © 2006 by severstal north aMerica, inc. 
all rights reserveD.
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a combination chamber of commerce and 
economic development agency, calculates 
that the county has gained $3.5 billion in new 
business investment and 3,734 new jobs since 
2003.  Most of this has happened around the 
Golden Triangle Regional Airport, its name 
taken from the way Columbus and nearby 
Starkville and West Point have together 
defined themselves for decades.
“The main thing that happened that 
changed this community was megasites,” 
says Joe Max Higgins, the Link’s hard- 
driving, plain-speaking chief executive. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority coined 
the term in 2004 for sites in the TVA region 
that could be deemed worthy of large-scale 
development—1,000 acres in size, environ-
mentally clean, and accessible to transpor-
tation and utilities, among other criteria. 
Higgins and his staff hopped on the 
opportunity, hurrying together an appli-
cation—a foot-high stack of papers—for a 
1,400-acre plot aside the airport.  It became 
one of the first two certified by the TVA’s 
independent megasite consultant.  Five 
months later, a new steel-making venture 
spoke for it.
At a proposed 1.2 million square feet 
and an initial investment of $625 million, 
the SeverCorr plant, a joint U.S.-Russian 
startup, was the largest industrial project 
under construction in the nation at the time, 
according to the Mississippi Development 
Authority.  Lowndes County and the state 
of Mississippi went together—and to great 
lengths—to secure it. 
From the state, the company got a $25 
million grant and $10 million loan for infra-
structure plus a bunch of tax credits and 
breaks on sales taxes and other state taxes.  
The county contributed the land, a $5 mil-
lion infrastructure grant and a cut of about 
40 percent on real estate taxes.  Together, the 
incentives were worth about $100 million.  
Of eight eventual megasites, Lowndes 
County won two, the second consisting  
of 1,800 acres on the airport’s other side.  
Paccar, of Bellevue, Wash., asked for a 
piece of it, proposing a $400 million, 
420,000-square-foot plant to make diesel 
engines for the company’s Kenworth and 
Peterbilt trucks.  Once again, the county  
and state teamed to cobble together a pack-
age of loans, grants and tax favors, with a 
total value this time of $40 million. 
SeverCorr, which changed its name to 
Severstal after its Russian partner became 
sole owner, began production in 2007 and 
is now doubling its capacity to 3.4 million 
tons of rolled steel a year in a final construc-
tion phase.  When the project is completed 
at the end of the year, the company projects 
it will have 650 employees—50 more than it 
promised the state in return for its conces-
sions—and a total start-to-finish investment 
of $1.4 billion in the plant.
Paccar, after a year’s delay due to the 
recession, is gearing up to open later this 
year with 250 employees and a commitment 
to the state for 250 more by 2013. 
Severstal and Paccar have only been the 
biggest deals among many that together 
have transformed Lowndes County into 
what Allegra Brigham describes as the 
economic “hub county for the region.”  
Brigham is the chief executive of the 
Lowndes-based 4-County Electric Power 
Association, which actually serves all or 
parts of eight counties.  She says all of the 
counties have “tremendously benefited” 
from the new industry Lowndes has  
succeeded in landing. 
It adds up to a stunning turnaround for a 
city and county that Higgins says tried but 
failed to attract any significant new employ-
ers for the previous 20 years.  All that time, 
the area was hemorrhaging jobs—most of 
them low-pay—as a number of manufactur-
ers closed shop or moved away, says Harry 
Sanders, member and former president of 
the Lowndes County Board of Supervisors 
and a lifelong Columbus resident. 
The new jobs, by contrast, require more 
skills and pay above average, Higgins says. 
As is typical of Mississippi, all the jobs are 
nonunion. 
While “local people moving up” have 
taken most of the new slots, some have been 
filled by  “a number of new people from 
all over the place,” says Jim McAlexander, 
president of Cadence Bank in Columbus. 
Some of the newcomers have bought and 
restored historic homes, producing a “great 
economic impact on the town,” says Brenda 
Caradine, who moved to Columbus 15 years 
ago, bought one of those historic homes and 
turned it into a bed and breakfast. 
She also organized the city’s annual Ten-
nessee Williams Tribute, a week or more of 
Lowndes County, Miss., 
by the numbers
population ......................................................... 59,284
Labor Force ....................................................... 25,844
unemployment Rate ................................11.6 percent
per Capita personal Income............................ $29,124
  *  u.S. Bureau of the Census, estimate July 1, 2008
  **  HAVER (BLS), December 2009
  ***  BEA/HAVER, 2007
ToP EMPLoyERS
Columbus Air Force Base  .................................... 3,075
Baptist Memorial Hospital  ................................... 1,095
Lowndes County public Schools ............................ 815 
Columbus Municipal School District ...................... 663
Severstal  ................................................................. 550
Weyerhaeuser ........................................................ 550
SouRCES: Self-reported









lectures, parties, house tours and profes-
sional performances that take their cue 
from the playwright’s birth in Columbus 
in 1911.  The Columbus Convention and 
Visitors Bureau has restored the 1875, two-
story house where he was born and lived 
until he was nearly 4 and made it the town’s 
welcome center.
The town’s 70-year-old annual spring 
“pilgrimage”—two weeks of home and 
garden tours, concerts, carriage rides and 
photo by susan c. thoMson
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of the bureau’s year-round menu of cultural, 
historical and recreational offerings. 
The industrial boom has been a plus for 
tourism, resulting in “more people going to 
events, more people able to visit our attrac-
tions,” says James Tsismanakis, the bureau’s 
chief executive. 
For all the new industry, the Columbus/
Lowndes economy still rests on some old 
reliables.  Paper maker Weyerhaeuser, a 
county presence for 30 years, operates two 
plants, one making pulp, the other turn-
ing it into an absorbent used in diapers and 
feminine hygiene products. 
Baptist Memorial Hospital, formerly 
Lowndes County Hospital, not only gener-
ates jobs, but the county’s profit on its sale  
in 2003 freed up funds for economic devel-
opment, Sanders says. 
But the area’s No. 1 economic engine has 
long been, and remains, the Columbus Air 
Force Base, a pilot-training facility since 
World War II.  Its payroll is by far the largest 
around, and about 55 percent of its employees 
are civilians, hired locally.  Adding together 
its payroll, its annual expenditures and the 
estimated value of the jobs it creates indi-
rectly, the base has calculated its annual eco-
nomic impact on Columbus at $321 million. 
“And it’s a constant,” says Sanders.  “They 
don’t have layoffs.”  An economic cushion 
in bad times past, the base has also proved a 
catalyst for the better times now following.  
The base figured “in the dynamics” in 
2002 when American Eurocopter, a subsid-
iary of a French-German helicopter maker, 
chose Lowndes County for its first U.S. 
plant, says Earl Walker, its general manager.  
Among the area’s attractions, company offi-
cials at the time also mentioned Mississippi 
State University and the regional airport.
With daily passenger flights to Atlanta 
and Memphis, the airport is already Missis-
sippi’s third busiest.  Its 6,500-foot runway 
is being lengthened to 8,000 feet to accom-
modate larger planes and has room to grow 
to 10,000 feet, while the airport itself has 
space for a second runway.
The university, in next-door Oktibbeha 
County, is known for its premier aerospace 
engineering programs and a flight research 
lab that helped give birth to Stark Aerospace 
and the Mississippi operations of Aurora 
Flight Sciences Corp., based in Manassas, Va.  
The companies took up residence near the 
airport in 2007 and 2006, respectively, Stark 
to make and Aurora to develop unmanned 
aircraft, commonly called drones.
The airport, the university, Eurocopter, 
Stark and Aurora have together provided the 
area with a critical—and marketable—mass 
of flight-related assets. 
Seeking to capitalize on them, the Link 
late last year announced its most ambitious 
industrial development yet.  The Golden 
Triangle Global Industrial Aerospace Park 
consists of 2,500 acres bordering the second 
megasite and offers the potential of 12 to 13 
million square feet of buildable space.
“It will be created along the same lines as 
the megasites, although no more certifica-
tions are available,” Higgins says.  Only two 
other sites in the entire Southeastern U.S. 
will offer any competition, he adds. 
McAlexander sees “tremendous potential” 
in a development targeting “one of the fast-
est growing industries in the future.”  And 
its creation is timely, he says, positioning 
Columbus/Lowndes County to be “far ahead 
of the game” when the economy takes off.  
Susan C. Thomson is a freelancer.
photo by chris jenkins
photo by susan c. thoMson
photo by u.s. air force base, coluMbus, Miss. 
The Columbus air Force base (top left) has the largest 
payroll in the area; here, two colonels check out a c-130j.  
The Golden Triangle Regional airport (top right) is sur-
rounded by new industrial development.  this Weyerhaeuser 
plant (bottom) makes specially treated, fluffy, absorbent 
fibers for use in diapers and other products.  
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By Kevin L. Kliesen
Signs Point toward Another 
Jobless Recovery
T
he U.S. economy finished 2009 on a high 
note, as real GDP advanced at about a  
6 percent annual rate over the last three 
months of the year.  This was a sharp contrast 
to the year’s dismal start, when the economy 
was struggling in the throes of a deep reces-
sion.  Typically, deep recessions tend to be 
followed by exceptionally rapid growth 
(6 percent or more), which leads to sharp 
declines in the unemployment rate but also to 
worries about rising inflation.  However, most 
forecasters expect only modest growth this 
year and a slow decline in the unemployment 
rate.  On a brighter note, most forecasters 
and Federal Reserve policymakers generally 
expect inflation to remain subdued in 2010.
Modest Recovery Seems Likely
Although the National Bureau of Economic   
Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating 
Committee has yet to make a determination, 
many economists believe that the recession 
ended in the summer of 2009.  Typically, the 
rebound in economic activity that follows 
recessions stems from rising real incomes 
and improving financial market conditions.  
As the economy improves, often because of 
a rebound in interest-sensitive consumer 
expenditures and the sale of newly built 
houses, businesses begin ordering new goods 
from manufacturers and increase their expen-
ditures on new equipment and structures.  
Since double-dip recessions are extremely 
rare, the rebound in activity is also a signal 
to firms to expand their payrolls.  This is 
traditionally why the NBER looks at nonfarm 
payroll employment to help the committee 
date business cycle turning points.
Through the first two months of 2010,  
the data on production, incomes and 
expenditures suggested that the economy 
was continuing to expand.  Importantly, 
consumer expenditures appeared to be 
growing modestly, and business capital 
spending began turning upward.  In par-
ticular, manufacturing activity appeared to 
be advancing briskly.  Part of manufac-
turing’s strength was due to a healthy 
rebound in exports, which was largely 
a reflection of the global economic 
recovery.  Although there were signs 
of stabilization in the housing sec-
tor, the level of home foreclosures 
and the inventory of previously 
sold homes on the market remained 
quite high.  Another source of con-
cern was the commercial real estate 
(CRE) sector, which saw sharply lower 
levels of construction and falling rents and, 
accordingly, rising loan defaults.  Problems 
in the CRE sector hampered small- and 
medium-size banks, which appear to have 
more exposure to nonperforming CRE loans 
than larger banks do. 
Overall, the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF) expects that real GDP will 
increase by 3 percent this year and next year, 
and that inflation, as measured by the CPI, 
will average about 1.75 percent this year and 
about 2 percent next.  By and large, forecast-
ers expect that the Federal Reserve will exit 
from its accommodative policy in a manner 
that neither exacerbates inflation expecta-
tions nor prematurely weakens the recovery.
Are Jobless Recoveries the New Norm?
Economists have been closely watching 
the contours of this recovery to see if the 
pattern of job growth—or lack, thereof—is 
similar to those that followed the previous 
two recessions.  Recall that labor markets did 
not improve until well after these recessions 
ended.  For example, the 2001 recession was 
deemed to have ended in November 2001, but 
the unemployment rate did not peak until 
June 2003 and payroll employment did not 
reach its trough until August 2003.
Although the current recovery is in its 
early stages, it nonetheless appears that a 
similar labor market pattern is developing.  
Despite rising real GDP in the third and 
fourth quarters of 2009, firms continued to  
 
 
shed jobs over the second half of 2009 and  
the first two months of 2010.  Although 
the SPF expects job gains to average about 
100,000 per month over the last nine 
months of 2010, these increases might be 
much less if not for the hiring associated 
with the 2010 decennial census.
While perhaps disconcerting to the public 
and economic policymakers, the lack of job 
growth in the face of rising real incomes and 
faster economic growth reflects continued 
strong gains in labor productivity.  In 2009, 
productivity rose 5.8 percent—the largest 
annual increase since 1965.  To most econo-
mists, strong productivity bodes well for the 
economy over the long run.  Indeed, rising 
living standards depend on little else.  In the 
short run, particularly in the early stages of 
the recovery, firms use their existing labor 
force and capital stock to fulfill orders and 
expand production.  Eventually, though, the 
extremely rapid rate of productivity growth 
increases the growth of income and consumer 
spending.  As the economy strengthens, firms 
once again begin to hire, forcing the unem-
ployment rate down to its natural rate.  
Kevin L. Kliesen is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/kliesen for more on his work.  
Douglas C. Smith provided research assistance.
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Decline in House Prices Slows Down;
District Still Faring Better than Nation
The Eighth Federal Reserve District 
is composed of four zones, each of 
which is centered around one of  
the four main cities: Little Rock, 












By Craig P. Aubuchon and Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
continued on Page 20
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I
n the fourth quarter of 2009, Eighth District house prices, as measured by the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA), fell by only 0.4 percent from the previous quarter, a much slower rate 
than the 1.7 percent decline between the second and third quarters.  However, compared with 
prices from a year earlier, the decline was 2.3 percent, the largest year-over-year decline since the 
collapse of the housing bubble in late 2007. 
Despite the fact that these declines were 
the largest of the current episode, the Dis-
trict housing market as a whole continued 
to outperform that of the nation.  Aggre-
gate house prices in the District did not 
increase as much as the nation’s during the 
boom, and the subsequent decline has been 
milder.  The District also reached its house 
price peak nearly a year after the nation and 
maintained prices near the peak for another 
year.  This pattern held for the majority of 
major Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
within the District; they experienced an 
average decline from peak of less than 3 per-
cent.  In contrast, some of the largest MSAs 
in the country experienced price declines 
greater than 30 percent through the fourth 
quarter of 2009.
Eighth District Outperforms the Nation
Figure 1 shows the growth in house prices 
for the nation and the District since 2000.
1  
The FHFA index tracks the repeat sales of 
homes that are financed with conforming 
mortgages from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
2   
By this measure, house prices for the United 
States peaked in the second quarter of 2007, 
with 70 percent growth since 2000.  Since 
then, the largest two price declines have come 
in the third quarter of 2008 and 2009, and by 
the fourth quarter of 2009, prices were only 
50 percent higher than they were in 2000.
In contrast, the aggregate prices for 
the District did not reach a peak until the 
first quarter of 2008 at a relative valuation 
much lower than that of the United States 
as a whole.  Equally notable, District house 
prices declined by a much smaller percent-
age from their peak.  Indeed, in the first 
quarter of 2009, house prices declined by 
less than a half percent.  It was only in the 
last two quarters of 2009 that house prices 
began to move lower, albeit at a rate that  
was slower than that for the nation as a 
whole.  It is no surprise, then, that since  
the first quarter of 2008, the large majority  
of District MSAs performed better than 
the nation as a whole with regard to price 
changes on a yearly level.  The primary 
exception was Fayetteville, Ark., which saw 
similar price declines as the nation over this 
time period but exceeded the U.S. decline  
on several occasions.
Comparing the Rise and the Fall 
among Eighth District MSAs
Figure 2 tells a somewhat surprising story 
for the District.  The regions with the largest 
house price increases were not necessarily 
the regions with the largest declines.  Indeed, 
those regions with strong population growth 
or employment growth might expect natural 
increases in house prices, in line with fun-
damental valuations.  Other regions expe-
rienced large price declines, despite below 
average increases in prices since 2000.  
Fort Smith, Ark., experienced the largest 
increase in house prices between the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 
2009 (which was the peak for the Fort Smith 
area.  Jefferson City, Mo., was the only other 
District MSA to experience a peak in the 
fourth quarter).  During that period, prices 
increased 1.8 percent; as shown in Figure 2, 
prices rose 45 percent since 2000, slightly 
above the District average of 40 percent.  
Without a decline in house prices, the Fort 
Smith metro area easily outperformed the 
district average of a 3 percent decline from 
the peak to the fourth quarter of 2009.  Other 
MSAs that fared better than the District 
average in terms of growth to peak (from 
Q1.2000) and decline since peak (to Q4.2009) 
include Little Rock, Ark., (43 percent 
increase, 1.3 percent decline) and Pine Bluff, 
Ark., (46.8 and –1.3 percent, respectively).
Conversely, Fayetteville, Ark., experi-
enced the largest decline in house prices E N DNO T E S
  1  The Eighth District housing price index is 
calculated as the average of the 18 MSAs that 
report house price data, weighted by popula-
tion in each MSA.  The 18 MSAs are: Fayette-
ville, Ark.; Fort Smith, Ark.; Hot Springs, 
Ark.; Jonesboro, Ark.; Little Rock, Ark.; Pine 
Bluff, Ark.; Texarkana, Ark.; Evansville, Ind.; 
Bowling Green, Ky.; Elizabethtown, Ky.; Lou-
isville, Ky.; Owensboro, Ky.; Columbia, Mo.; 
Jefferson City, Mo.; St. Louis, Mo.; Springfield, 
Mo.; Jackson, Tenn.; and Memphis, Tenn.
  2  In contrast, the S&P/Case-Shiller index 
tracks homes that are also financed using 
larger or more unconventional mortgages.  
Furthermore, the S&P/Case-Shiller index is 
value weighted, so that more expensive homes 
influence the index more heavily; the FHFA 
index is unit weighted, so that regions with 
more housing units are more influential in the 
index.  For a more detailed description, see 
Aubuchon and Wheelock.
  3  The 10-City Composite index is considered a 
snapshot of U.S. house prices, particularly in 
larger regions.  The Composite 10 index was 
used as a baseline in the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (bank stress tests) con-
ducted by the Federal Reserve in early 2009. 
R E F E R E NC E
Aubuchon, Craig P.; and Wheelock, David C.  
“How Much Have U.S. House Prices Fallen?”  
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ National 
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source: federal housing finance agencye c o n o M Y   A t   A   g L A n c e
Eleven more charts are available on the web version of this issue.  Among the areas they cover are agriculture, commercial 
banking, housing permits, income and jobs.  Much of the data is specific to the Eighth District.  To go directly to these charts, 
use this URL:  www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/2010/b/pdf/04-10data.pdf
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CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE INTEREST RATES    



































NOTE:  On Dec. 16, 2008, the FOMC set a target range for 
the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent.  The observations 
plotted since then are the midpoint of the range (0.125 percent).
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NOTE:  Each bar is a one-quarter growth rate (annualized); 
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from the peak, at 10.1 percent.  This price 
decline was on par with major metropolitan 
areas like Washington, D.C., (9.1 percent), 
New York (12.1 percent), Boston (13.1 per-
cent) and Chicago (14.1 percent).  Within 
the District, Fayetteville also experienced 
the second-largest price increase, of nearly 
57 percent between the first quarter of 2000 
and the local peak in the second quarter of 
2007.  Other cities that exceeded the average 
price increase and experienced greater than 
average price declines were St. Louis (51.4 
and –5.3 percent); Texarkana, Ark., (46 and 
–4.2 percent); Hot Springs, Ark., (65.5 and 
–4.9 percent) and Elizabethtown, Ky., (49.3 
and –3.2 percent).  
In contrast, only Memphis, Tenn., lagged 
the District average in terms of house price 
growth and exceeded the District average 
for price declines.  With price appreciation  
of only 27.7 percent, Memphis was the fifth-
slowest growing MSA in the District; how-
ever, the relative price decline of 5 percent 
was the second-largest decline, behind only 
that of Fayetteville.
District Relative to Top 10 Metro Areas
Figure 3 presents the FHFA data for the 
four largest District MSAs alongside the 
10 MSAs that define the S&P/Case-Shiller 
10-City Composite HPI.
3  In this view, 
the District MSAs’ price increases and 
decreases between 2000 and 2009 seem to 
match only those of Denver.  Furthermore, 
this comparison reveals that the differences 
in performance among the District MSAs 
paled in comparison to the differences in 
performance among these 10 large non-
District MSAs.  Overall, the MSAs of the 
District exhibited lower price fluctuations 
compared with several non-District MSAs.  
This experience suggests that when consid-
ering the performance of Eighth District 
house prices, it is important to consider not 
just the differences between District MSAs, 
but also consider the performance as judged 
against the nation as a whole.  
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay is an economist and 
Craig P. Aubuchon is a senior research associ-
ate at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
See http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/bandyo-
padhyay/ for more on Bandyopadhyay’s work.
continued from Page 18
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he hybrid adjustable rate mortgage 
or hybrid ARM (prophetically, the 
acronym is HARM) was the most common 
subprime mortgage product.  Hybrid-ARM 
products were specialized products that 
included an initial period over which the 
repayment schedule on the mortgage resem-
bled that of a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and 
a subsequent period over which the payment 
schedule resembled an ARM.
1  The tempo-
rary introductory teaser rate was kept lower, 
arguably, to make the product attractive to 
the subprime borrower.  The date at which 
the payments reset into an indexed rate (for 
example, LIBOR plus 6 percent) was typi-
cally two or three years after the closing date 
on the mortgage.
2  What was the rationale 
behind such a unique design on subprime 
products?  Did this unique design have a 
role to play in the subsequent collapse of  
this market?
Why Hybrid ARM?
First, subprime borrowers were typically 
those who had impaired or incomplete 
credit histories.  Because of their higher risk 
of default, subprime borrowers were charged 
higher interest rates than conventional or 
prime borrowers on all kinds of loans.  For 
example, the interest rates on subprime auto 
loans were about 25-30 percent on average, 
studies have shown.
3  If the interest rate on 
subprime mortgages had been set to price 
the risk as was done on subprime auto loans, 
it was unlikely that the mortgages could 
have been afforded by subprime borrowers.   
This is because mortgage obligations are 
significantly higher than payments on 
other forms of consumer debt, including 
auto loans.  The hybrid-ARM product was 
conceived to enable subprime borrowers to 
obtain mortgages at affordable rates.
4
It was believed that this could be achieved 
through the appreciation in house prices.  
Economist Gary Gorton argued in a paper 
in 2008 that the mortgage design sought to 
benefit from house price appreciation over 
short horizons.  All else equal, borrowers 
could build up equity in their homes in a 
period of rising house prices and, in the 
eyes of the lender, become less of a risk on 
subsequent mortgages.  This allowed them 
to refinance at a lower rate (on the subse-
quent mortgage), which also reduced their 
likelihood of default.  In essence, house price 
appreciation was critical to the viability of the 
hybrid-ARM design.  Therefore, the hybrid 
ARM product allowed payments at the teaser 
rate essentially to help the borrower build 
up equity, but once the loan reset into the 
indexed rate, payment obligations increased.  
This was done to reduce the lenders’ exposure 
to a high-risk borrower over a long horizon 
and essentially force a refinancing of the 
mortgage.  The borrower was prevented from 
refinancing early by including a penalty for 
prepayment on the mortgage.
In a recent paper, economists Geetesh 
Bhardwaj and Rajdeep Sengupta point to 
some lesser known facts about subprime 
mortgages in general.
5  First, over 70 percent 
of subprime originations for each year 
(2000-2007) were originated as refinances.  
Second, a significant majority of these 
originations were hybrid-ARM products 
designed to reset into a fully indexed rate 
after two or three years.  Significantly, this 
reset was designed to be a step up (but 
hardly ever a step down), so as to increase 
the payment burden and essentially force a 
refinancing of the loan.  Third, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, teaser rates on hybrid 
ARMs were not low and not significantly 
different from those on closing rates on 
subprime FRMs.  Fourth, most subprime 
originations included prepayment penal-
ties with the prepayment term expiring no 
sooner than the reset date on the ARM.  
This meant that for hybrid-ARM products, 
the contract ensured that the penalty would 
be in effect at least as long as the borrower 
was required to pay the teaser rate.  In short, 
the mortgage was designed to ensure that 
subprime borrowers continued to make 
monthly payments at the closing rates before 
they could refinance into another mortgage.
Repayment Behavior  
on Subprime Mortgages
In terms of actual repayment behavior, 
the most important aspect of subprime loan 
performance was the high rates of early 
prepayments on the loan.  A loan is said to 
be prepaid when it is either refinanced into 
another mortgage or the property is sold off.  
This is hardly surprising because refinancing 
was an integral part of the mortgage design.
A noteworthy observation here is that low 
interest rates were not always the motiva-
tion behind prepayments (refinances) in the 
subprime market.  The notable examples 
here were hybrid-ARM products originated 
in 2003, a year of historically low interest  
rates.  Interestingly, in all the years these 
products were in existence, subprime origi- 
nations from 2003 showed the lowest default  
rates.  However, the principal reason for the 
remarkable performance of 2003 origina-
tions was high and early refinances.
6  Indeed, 
almost 83 percent of hybrid-ARM subprime 
products originated in 2003 were refinanced 
by the end of 2006.  The corresponding per-
centage for FRMs was 63 percent.  Signifi-
cantly, the fact that mortgages originated 
s u B P R I M e   M o R t g A g e s
Why HARM the Subprime Borrower?
By Rajdeep Sengupta and Yu Man Tam
continued on Page 22
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1   During the fixed leg of the hybrid ARM, the 
mortgagee pays a lower introductory closing 
rate called the teaser rate.  The teaser rate 
remains in effect until the reset date, after 
which the repayment schedule on the hybrid 
ARM resembles an ARM.  The reset date, 
market index rate used and the margin are 
decided at the closing date.
2   These mortgages are also called the 2/28 
(two-year teaser rate followed by a 28-year 
ARM) and a 3/27 (three-year teaser rate  
followed by a 27-year ARM) respectively.
3   See Adams, Einav and Levin. 
4   See Gorton.
5   See Bhardwaj and Sengupta.
6   See Bhardwaj and Sengupta.
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during the low-interest-rate environment 
around 2003-2004 and refinanced in a 
high-rate environment in subsequent years 
indicates that lower rates were hardly the 
motivation behind subprime refinances.  
While we don’t know for sure what the 
motivation was, the most plausible explana-
tion would be to extract home equity.
Why Did the Subprime Market Collapse?
The important thing to remember is that 
a borrower on the brink of default has an 
exit option: prepay the mortgage either by 
refinancing or selling the property.  Interest-
ingly, Bhardwaj and Sengupta found that 
the total proportion of loans that either 
went into default or were prepaid remained 
unchanged across all vintages.  More impor-
tant, there was a significantly high incidence 
of early prepayments on subprime origina-
tions of earlier vintages.  However, this was 
followed by a sharp drop in prepayment rates 
after 2006, suggesting that fewer borrowers 
could use the prepayment exit option. 
Why did prepayments decline for origi-
nations of later vintages?  Herein lay the 
importance of the subprime mortgage 
design.  Prepayments (either in the form of 
refinances or an outright sale of the prop-
erty) were critical to the sustainability of 
subprime mortgages.  In a regime of rising 
house prices, borrowers could avoid default 
by prepaying their loans (either through a 
refinance or a property sale).  Moreover, if 
the house price appreciation was sufficiently 
large, a borrower could recover the costs 
of refinancing and even choose to extract 
equity.  However, this option was no longer 
available when prices did not appreciate.  
Consequently, borrower defaults began to 
increase sharply in 2006, when house prices 
ceased to appreciate.  
Rajdeep Sengupta is an economist and Yu Man 
Tam is a senior research associate at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/sengupta/ for more on 
Sengupta’s work.
This is in response to “Inflation May Be the Next 
Dragon To Slay,” an article that appeared in the 
January 2010 issue of The Regional Economist.  




I would like to thank the researcher for 
clearly explaining the predicament that those in 
charge of the Fed will likely to be facing.  There 
is so much currency in the system, and the 
Fed continues to debase the dollar by printing 
money by the trillion.  Where will it end?  Does 
the American public realize the government 
isn’t a separate entity but an extension of 
themselves?  YOU the Americans will have to 
pay all the trillions in debt that the government 
is taking on.  And your standard of living, based 
on debt and spending, cannot go on forever.  It 
appears as though the high-octane lifestyle is 
almost at an end.  Unusually, l found this article 
through the St. Louis Fed Reserve web site, 
which is interesting in itself because usually 
those who let the cat out of the bag, as it were, 
are most likely to conceal it.  On the same 
page, a poll is being carried out about inflation.  
Currently, 812 people have taken the poll and 
61 percent believe that inflation is “dead in the 
water.”  The dangers of such massive injections 
into the currency supply are being aired with 
increased vigor by many except the popular 
press.  Unfortunately, the masses will not read 
the said article or know how to insulate them-
selves from the pain associated with high  
levels of inflation.  I hope the problems do  
not come to light, but I bought 7 kg of silver 
today because l am betting that they do.  Does 
anyone have a time frame to said inflation?   
I am guessing 2-3 years, but would welcome 
comments.  Search for Bob Chapman.  He 
constantly talks about said problems.
John Kitcher, English teacher in elementary 
school in Seoul, South Korea
Go to http://stlouisfed.org/ExternalCFForms/
EditorLetterEnt.cfm to submit a letter electroni-
cally.  You may also submit a letter to the editor 
using the e-mail address or street address on 
Page 2.
R e A D e R   e x c H A n g e
LETTER To THE EDIToR continued from Page 21
22   The Regional Economist  |  April 2010FED FLASH PoLL RESuLTS
1,114 REsponsEs as oF 3/9/2010
THIS ISSuE’S PoLL quESTIoN:
Which scenario do you think is most likely for  
the world economy?
Submit your question in a letter to the editor.  (See Page 2.)  One  
question will be answered by the appropriate economist in each issue.
Carlos Garriga has been an economist in the 
research division of the federal reserve bank of  
st. louis since 2007.  his main expertise is in  
macro-economics and the effects of government 
policy.  recently, garriga has studied the effects of 
mortgage innovations in the recent housing boom and 
the role of the housing market in the financial crises.  
in his free time, he enjoys spending time with his 
family and any outdoor activity.  see http://research.













FEDERAL RESERVE EARNINGS PAID TO THE U.S. TREASURY, IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS






source: federal reserve board of governors
How does the Fed make money for the Treasury, and 
are profits audited by Congress or any agency? 
the Federal Reserve system is an independent entity within the govern-
ment.  the Federal Reserve’s revenue is mainly derived from its regular  
operations, that is, from the interest on u.s. government securities and 
discount window lending.
the open market operations are used to buy and sell u.s. treasury and  
federal agency securities in the open market, whereas the discount window 
is used to lend to depository institutions directly from the Fed’s lending 
facility.  these operations are used to affect the demand for and supply of 
balances of depository institutions and affect the federal funds rate. 
other sources of income are the interest on foreign currency investments 
held by the system and fees received for services provided to depository 
institutions (for example, check clearing, funds transfers and automated 
clearinghouse operations).  After paying its expenses, the Federal Reserve 
turns the rest of its earnings over to the u.s. treasury. 
For 2009, the Fed returned about $45 billion to the treasury.  this is the most 
in the 96-year history of the central bank.  the record amount results from the 
programs the Fed initiated as a response to the largest crises since the great 
Depression.  these programs included the purchase of bonds and mortgage-
backed securities to reduce the interest rate and, therefore, to stimulate the 
economy.  the profit last year was 30 percent higher than the largest previous 
refund to the treasury, which occurred in 2007.  Despite its independence, the 
Federal Reserve system and the Reserve banks are audited and reviewed at 
different levels every year.  the complete reports, audits and assessments by 
the government Accountability office (gAo) and the Board’s office of Inspec-
tor general (oIg) are available in the Board’s annual report.  go to www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/ to read the repo t.  Because the 
Fed is self-financed, it is not subject to the congressional budgetary process. 
When a new issue of The Regional Economist is published, a new poll is 
posted on our web site.  The poll question is always pegged to an article in 
that quarter’s issue.  Here are the results of the poll that went with the  
January issue.  The question stemmed from the article “Inflation May Be  
the Next Dragon To Slay.”
WHICH Do you THINk IS THE ToP RISk FoR REIGNITING 
INFLATIoN ovER THE NExT SEvERAL yEARS?
  There is no inflation risk—it’s dead and buried.
  The federal budget deficit continues to mushroom.
  The Fed waits too long to return the monetary supply 
to a pre-crisis level.
  Commodity prices balloon again as investors tire of 
low-yielding Treasury securities and shift their money  
into higher-yielding commodity contracts and other assets.
  There turns out to be less slack (smaller output gap) 
in the economy than many experts believe. 
1. “Big spender” countries (especially U.S.) live within their means, and miserly 
countries (especially China) break open the piggy bank.
2. Countries don’t coordinate policies.  Trade imbalances return—in spades.   
Boom followed by bust (again).
3. Economic restructuring stalls.  Stimuli end.  Private spending slows. 
Economies tank.
  After reading “Economic Hangover: The Recovery Is Likely To Be Prolonged, 
Painful,” go to www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re to vote.  (This is not a 
scientific poll.)
FED PRoGRAM To FoCuS oN CoMMuNITy DEvELoPMENT
“exploring Innovation in community Development Week” will be April 19-23.  
the public is invited to partake in the events of the week, organized by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of st. Louis.  Programs are being planned throughout  
the eighth District.
the premiere event, “Restructuring and Retooling for the Future,” will take 
place April 20.  It is the first in a yearlong series of public policy dialogues on the 
essential elements of great community development.  the program will be at 
the Fed in st. Louis and will be broadcast via videoconference to audiences at 
the Bank’s branches in Little Rock, Louisville and Memphis.  confirmed national 
panelists include Ruth Mccambridge of the Nonprofit Quarterly and Ray Boshara, 
vice president and senior research f ellow at the new America Foundation.  
Attendees will also hear about the st. Louis Fed’s “10,000-Hour challenge,” a 
campaign to encourage community development professionals to become 
experts in innovation.
other activities include an April 21 screening of the documentary “new neigh-
bors,” the greater Louisville nonprofit technology summit on April 22 and the  
st. Louis Regional Housing conference on April 23.
go to www.stlouisfed.org/event/01eD for a complete schedule and registra-
tion information.










n e x t   I s s u e
The Economic Progress of African-Americans
How significant has been the economic progress 
of African-Americans in the U.S. since 1970?   
The common perception is that inequality 
between races has decreased.  Did these societal 
changes translate into economic changes, as well, 
for blacks?  Did economic well-being of African-
American children improve?  Read about Afri-
can-American economic progress in urban areas 
in the July issue of The Regional Economist.
Tell a friend about The Regional Economist!  
   RE is published every January, April, July and October by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  To receive your free 
subscription by mail, fill out this card and send to:   
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Public Affairs Dept.,  
Attn: Carol Musser, Box 442, St. Louis, MO, 63166.
You can also read RE online at www.stlouisfed.org/re.  
You’ll also find instructions there for signing up to get an 
e-mail when a new issue goes online.
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